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TIGHTENING THE OODA LOOP:
POLICE MILITARIZATION, RACE, AND
ALGORITHMIC SURVEILLANCE
Jeffrey L. Vagle*
This Article examines how military automated surveillance and intelligence
systems and techniques, when used by civilian police departments to enhance pre-
dictive policing programs, have reinforced racial bias in policing. I will focus on two
facets of this problem. First, I investigate the role played by advanced military
technologies and methods within civilian police departments. These approaches
have enabled a new focus on deterrence and crime prevention by creating a system of
structural surveillance where decision support relies increasingly upon algorithms
and automated data analysis tools and automates de facto penalization and con-
tainment based on race. Second, I will explore these militarized systems, and their
effects, from an outside-in perspective, paying particular attention to the racial,
societal, economic, and geographic factors that play into the public perception of
these new policing regimes. I will conclude by proposing potential solutions to this
problem that incorporate tests for racial bias to create an alternative system that
follows a true community policing model.
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INTRODUCTION
As militaries transition from a war footing to a postwar posture, they
inevitably shed excess equipment and technology that is outdated, no
longer needed, or too expensive to maintain. In the drawdown from the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military found willing recipients of
this material in local and state police departments. In addition to these
technology transfers, local police departments have increasingly adopted
military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—originally conceived
and designed for military units in combat operations—for use in their day-
to-day policing. This combination has led to the overall militarization of
civilian police forces in the United States, putting wartime tools in the
hands of peace officers.
This trend toward police militarization has found enthusiastic support
from departments adhering to the “broken windows” theory of policing,
especially with respect to technologies and TTPs meant for intelligence
analysis or surveillance purposes. The locus of this relationship can be
found in the information-centric approaches found in broken windows
policing and other zero-tolerance, quality-of-life police programs. Since
military intelligence has long prized information-centric methods as criti-
cal to the goal of actionable intelligence, militarized systems and ap-
proaches appear to be a perfect fit to modern policing. This phenomenon
may be seen as the natural result of the industrial and post-industrial soci-
ety’s desire to maximize control and efficiency—across all spheres of life—
through careful observation and data analysis. While advances in policing
techniques have garnered many societal benefits, they have also established
a system of structural surveillance that has entered a renaissance with the
help of military technologies. Automated surveillance analysis systems, de-
veloped in the wake of 9/11, have given police departments a powerful
toolkit to advance algorithmic policing strategies.
But these algorithmic approaches too often target poor and minority
communities, inserting a de facto racial component into the system, even
when the automated intelligence systems are fed “objective” crime data.
For example, in a recent investigation of software used by state and local
criminal justice authorities to predict the risk of recidivism of those
booked into city and county jails, researchers found that these algorithms
were not only wildly inaccurate in their assessments, but were also highly
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likely to falsely flag Black defendants as future criminals.1 Algorithmic
“scoring” mechanisms like this are becoming increasingly common tools
for criminal courts and law enforcement, which are seeking an informa-
tion-based advantage in the control of criminal activity. These programs
have become so popular, in fact, that Congress is considering mandating
their use in federal prisons.2
This Article examines how military automated surveillance and intel-
ligence systems, when used by civilian police departments to enhance pre-
dictive policing programs, have reinforced racial bias in policing. I will
focus on two facets of this problem. First, my research studies the role
played by advanced military technologies and methods within civilian po-
lice departments. These methods have enabled a new focus on deterrence
and crime prevention by creating a system of structural surveillance where
decision support relies increasingly upon algorithms and automated data
analysis tools, and which automates de facto penalization and containment
based on race. Second, I will explore these systems, and their effects, from
an outside-in perspective, paying particular attention to racial, societal, ec-
onomic, and geographic factors that play into the public perception of
these policing regimes. I will conclude by proposing potential solutions to
this problem that incorporate tests for racial bias to create an alternative
system that follows a true community policing model.
I. THE MILITARIZATION OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
The militarization of civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) has
long been viewed as anathema to the founding principles of the United
States and corrosive to civil liberties in a constitutional democracy gener-
ally.3 Paradoxically, contemporary American society has increasingly taken
a distinctly militaristic approach to solving its (non-military) political, so-
cial, and economic issues, applying war metaphors to programs and poli-
cies to emphasize the seriousness of the problem and the approach to it, for
example, the “war on drugs” or the “war on poverty.”4 These mixed sig-
nals have been the backdrop to a steady increase in the militarization of
U.S. civilian police forces post-World War II, with racial tensions, “broken
1. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict
Future Criminals. And it’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www
.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (last visited June
28, 2016).
2. Id.
3. See Phillip T. Wyrick, Police Militarization: Attitudes Towards the Militarization of
the American Police (May 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, East Tennessee State University) (on
file with Digital Commons, East Tennessee State University), http://dc.etsu.edu/etd/1161/.
4. See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and
Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (1997) (“This attention to medicalization
neglects other social problems metaphors, particularly the metaphor of war (e.g., the War on
Poverty, the war on drugs).”).
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windows policing,” the “war on drugs,” and the “global war on terror”
acting as the primary catalysts of this phenomenon.5 The most visible as-
pect of police militarization can be seen in the increased deployment
within LEAs of weapons, equipment, and training designed for use in
combat by militaries.6 While these manifestations might be the most out-
wardly obvious signs of this militarization trend, there is a more basic facet
of it that LEAs have almost universally adopted: intelligence operations.7
A. Military Intelligence and the Development of the OODA Loop
The importance of intelligence operations to the military is a long
accepted principle, since as often quite large and widely distributed orga-
nizations, militaries are expected to think and act as if they were a unitary
being.8 The pace, environment, and sheer horror of combat combine to
create a state of near chaos — “the realm of uncertainty” —through which
militaries are forced to navigate.9 To mitigate at least some of the disori-
enting effects of warfare, modern militaries must organize themselves
around rational, bureaucratic principles, with robust networks of commu-
nication and information management at their core.10 Military command
structures simply cannot function without the timely communication of
information on a wide range of broad and narrow topics including terrain,
troop strength and movements, civilian considerations, transportation net-
works, availability of supplies, enemy disposition and morale, weather and
light conditions, and more—all in support of the theory that the better
prepared and informed army has the advantage.11 This general concept is
5. Id. at 7-9; Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New
Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2010); Bernard E.
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); Jamila Michener, Neighborhood Disorder and Local
Participation: Examining the Political Relevance of “Broken Windows”, 35 POL. BEHAV. 777 (2013);
Steve Herbert, Policing the Contemporary City: Fixing Broken Windows or Shoring Up Neo-Liber-
alism?, 5 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 445 (2001).
6. Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense of
American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUST. Q. 607 (1997).
7. Robert W. Taylor & Amanda L. Russell, The Failure of Police “Fusion” Centers and the
Concept of a National Intelligence Sharing Plan, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 184 (2012).
8. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 37-39 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret trans.,
2007).
9. Id. at 46.
10. M. D. Feld, Information and Authority: The Structure of Military Organization, 24 AM.
SOC. REV. 15, 17-19 (1959) (arguing that concept of bureaucratic organization is essential to
efficient military operations, where the principles of military command require levels of predict-
ability and control at a level of scalability that precludes ad hoc organization. Because warfare is,
by nature, chaotic and corrosive to organization and communication, military organizations at-
tempt to minimize these effects through levels of bureaucratic stability that enable information
flow—one of the essential requirements of command.).
11. John A. Allen et al., A Framework for Supporting Human Military Planning, 2 ANN.
CONF. INT’L TECH ALLIANCE 1, 1-8 (2008) (arguing that the hierarchical bureaucracy of mili-
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often referred to as military intelligence, or more succinctly,
“intelligence.”12
The term intelligence is not well defined, however, as it draws from a
wide array of broader issues, such as strategy, command and control, and
communications.13 It is clearly more than an exhaustive cataloging of all
available information. Even if this were possible, such a tool would quickly
prove useless to militaries as their organizations became mired in irrelevant
information, and would be forced to spend valuable time and resources
ferreting out the useful bits.14 Intelligence, therefore, must produce infor-
mation in a form and quantity that can be used by the organization to
make timely decisions regarding plans and operations. This characteristic is
often summarized as “actionable” intelligence.15 The goal of perfectly ac-
tionable intelligence is often unattainable, however, and is best thought of
in aspirational terms.16
The industrialization of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries yielded
paradigmatic advances in the technology and, subsequently, the conduct of
warfare, which in turn brought with it the critical need for more rapidly-
made decisions based on fresher, more accurate, and more detailed intelli-
gence.17 The United States military experience in Vietnam illustrated just
how crucial intelligence and communications had become in modern war-
tary organizations is based around the need to efficiently pass information, intent, plans, and
commands up and down the chain of command that is both time sensitive and scalable to large
organizations).
12. See MICHAEL I. HANDEL, Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise, in PARADOXES
OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MICHAEL I. HANDEL 1, 1-58 (Richard K.
Betts &Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., 2003).
13. See Michael Warner, Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence,” 46 STUD. INTELLIGENCE, 1,
15 (2002).
14. See Robert L. Bateman III, Avoiding Information Overload, 78 MIL. REV., 53, 53
(1998).
15. Andrew Rathmell, Towards Postmodern Intelligence, 17 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECUR-
ITY 87, 88-89 (2002).
16. In fact, as military intelligence related incidents involving torture, untruths, and cen-
sorship over the past decade have shown us, the remorseless pursuit of perfectly actionable intelli-
gence has led to bloated military contractor budgets, loss of friendly and civilian life, and
atrocities. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEW YORKER 38 (May 17, 2004).
17. Military theoreticians divide the history of modern warfare into four generations,
each of which marked by technical, political, economic or social changes or advances. The first
generation of modern warfare emerged with the widespread use of gunpowder and the shift in
Europe from a feudal economy to the modern nation-state. Second generation warfare is identi-
fied with the nation-state’s ability to generate large revenue streams through widespread taxation
on increasing wealth. The German Blitzkrieg is the starting point of third generation warfare,
with high maneuverability being used to break the protracted impasses characteristic of World
War I. Finally, fourth generation warfare—the mode in which theorists currently put us—is
summarized by enormous advances in communications and weapon technologies along with the
rise of guerilla movements and asymmetric warfare. See THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND
THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Zenith Press 2006).
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fare, where larger, better-equipped forces were often outmatched by much
smaller, yet better informed, groups of guerrillas and regular army
soldiers.18 The post-Vietnam collapse of the U.S. military sent shock
waves through the Pentagon, whose leadership began the arduous process
of rebuilding a communications and intelligence centric army capable of
fighting a fourth generation war.19
During this period of U.S. military restructuring, a U.S. Air Force
combat flight instructor named John Boyd, long known by military strate-
gists for his highly analytical approach to solving military problems, began
development of a general theory of military organizational analysis and
action. He sought to address the challenge of intelligence and communica-
tion in a fast-moving conflict.20 As a veteran of air combat flying the F-86
Sabre in “MiG Alley” during the Korean War, Boyd knew well the chal-
lenge for fighter pilots of gathering, processing, and acting on information
in a very short amount of time, all while flying an aircraft filled with jet
fuel and munitions at hundreds of miles per hour, often while being shot
at.21 Boyd, a student not only of the great modern military theorists such
as Clausewitz and J.F.C. Fuller, but also of philosophers, mathematicians,
and physicists, including Kurt Gödel and Werner Heisenberg, actively
sought out symmetries and commonalities in his analyses in an attempt to
get at the true root of the problem at hand.22 His multidisciplinary ap-
proach allowed him to extrapolate common principles from his exper-
iences, and in 1976, he authored the first of five essays on the cognitive,
18. A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in the January 1968 Tet Offen-
sive, where North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) guerilla forces conducted a
series of well-timed, highly-coordinated attacks on U.S. military installations and South
Vietnamese government buildings across all of South Vietnam. While these attacks were ulti-
mately repulsed by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, the widespread effects of the offensive
marked the beginning of the end of the American war in Vietnam. Historians and military
theorists widely attribute much of the success of the outnumbered NVA and VC forces to poor
U.S. military intelligence, which completely failed to anticipate the Tet Offensive as well as the
military, political, and social costs that would follow from it. See JAMES J. WIRTZ, THE TET
OFFENSIVE: INTELLIGENCE FAILURE IN WAR (1994).
19. See HARRY G. SUMMERS, ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM
WAR (1995). “Fourth-generation warfare” is the term military analysts have used to describe the
post-9/11 style of asymmetric war now seen, where the first-generation war was Napoleonic in
nature, the second-generation war was Prussian, and the third-generation war was based on rapid
maneuver.
20. See Scott E. McIntosh, The Wingman-Philosopher of MiG Alley: John Boyd and the
OODA loop, 58 AIR POWER HIST., 24, 24 (2011)
21. See DAVID S. FADOK, JOHN BOYD AND JOHN WARDEN: AIR POWER’S QUEST FOR
STRATEGIC PARALYSIS (1995). It is somewhat noteworthy that Boyd himself shot down no en-
emy aircraft during his combat tour in Korea. This was due not to a lack of combat sorties—
Boyd flew 22—but to the fact that all of his combat flights were as a wingman, rather than lead.
His perspective and experience in this role, however, may well have given Boyd the insights he
later developed in his military theories and instruction. See McIntosh, supra note 20.
22. See FADOK, supra note 21, at 14-15.
FALL 2016] Tightening the OODA Loop 107
psychological, and temporal processes core to all military intelligence anal-
ysis and decision-making processes, from the highest command levels to
the lowest.23
Boyd’s described his groundbreaking theory as a cognitive cycle con-
taining four tasks: Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action
(OODA) (see Figure 1).24 These actions worked together to create a feed-
back loop that gave those who were more adept at accelerating this loop a
tactical advantage over their less-nimble adversaries. As applied to Boyd’s
initial use of the term in aviation combat, a pilot first considers the relevant
information available about the situation (“observation”), such as an adver-
sary’s weaponry, their level of training, and the environmental conditions.
The pilot uses these observations to narrow the possible universe of deci-
sions (“orientation”) in the tactical situation. Based on these first two steps,
the pilot selects the best solution to their tactical problem (“decision”) and
makes the necessary adjustments to realize their decision (“action”).
FIGURE 1: THE OODA LOOP
Through informed use of the Boyd Cycle—more often referred to as
the OODA loop—one could not only gain a strategic or tactical advantage
over one’s enemy, but in turn, disrupt the enemy’s own OODA loop by
denying them the ability to run through its stages due to the speed at
23. Id. at 14.
24. Since this Article is not devoted to Boyd’s OODA loop per se, I will restrict the
cycle’s description to its most basic form. Boyd’s insight can still be quite easily seen in this
summarized version, as it describes the rational human behavior found in individuals as well as
organizations. For a detailed analysis of the OODA loop, see Id.; Arthur K. Cebrowski & John J.
Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 28 (1998);
McIntosh, supra note 20.
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which you are able to run through your own.25 The goal for any military
organization, according to Boyd, is to increase the speed at which it can
navigate this cycle, or to “tighten” the OODA loop.26 Therefore, the
army that can affect the tightest OODA loop is able to “get inside” their
opponent’s cycle, and thus disrupt their ability to gather, process, and act
on intelligence.27
The OODA loop, as Boyd observed, characterized the process all
living things go through as part of their everyday survival.28 Learning and
adapting are what successful individuals and groups accomplish faster than
their less lucky competitors. Boyd’s great contribution was distilling this
naturally occurring process into a form, which could be analyzed and im-
plemented by military strategists and tacticians. Boyd continued to develop
this concept through the mid-1980s and continued to present his theories
to large military and civilian audiences well into his retirement.29 Boyd’s
theories enjoyed moderate success among contemporary military leader-
ship at the time, mainly among theorists and scholars. But in the early
2000s, his ideas were rediscovered and found a heightened relevance
among a new generation of warriors joining a high-tech military in a post-
9/11 world.30 This renewed popularity soared even further when nonmili-
tary and quasi-military organizations seeking a competitive advantage over
crime through information-centric efficiency—universally accepted as the
path to success since the earliest days of industrialization—increasingly
turned to military organizational theories and doctrines for inspiration.31
25. See FADOK, supra note 21.
26. See McIntosh, supra note 20, at 29.
27. Id. at 26.
28. See McIntosh, supra note 20.
29. See Bruce Berkowitz, John Boyd: The American Sun Tzu, 47 ORBIS 370, 372-73
(2003).
30. See infra Section III for a detailed exploration of this phenomenon.
31. See, e.g., MARK BENDER, OPERATION EXCELLENCE: SUCCEEDING IN BUSINESS AND
LIFE THE U.S. MILITARY WAY (2004); PARTHA BOSE, ALEXANDER THE GREAT’S ART OF
STRATEGY: THE TIMELESS LEADERSHIP LESSONS OF HISTORY’S GREATEST EMPIRE BUILDER
(2003); DAN CARRISON & ROD WALSH, SEMPER FI: BUSINESS LEADERSHIP THE MARINE
CORPS WAY (1999); SCOTT W. CHRISTIE, PRECISION GUIDED LEADERSHIP: HOW MODERN
MILITARY DOCTRINE CAN SAVE CORPORATE AMERICA (2003); GENE KLANN, CRISIS LEAD-
ERSHIP: USING MILITARY LESSONS, ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCES, AND THE POWER OF
INFLUENCE TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF CHAOS ON THE PEOPLE YOU LEAD (2003); ANTHONY
J. LE STORTI, WHEN YOU’RE ASKED TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE: PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS TEAM-
WORK AND LEADERSHIP FROM THE U.S. ARMY’S ELITE RANGERS (2003); Douglas C. Bern-
hardt, ‘I Want It Fast, Factual, Actionable’—Tailoring Competitive Intelligence to Executives’ Needs, 27
LONG RANGE PLANNING 3, 12-24 (1994) (showing that, since the mid-1990s, businesses and
other non-military organizations have fostered the emergence of a sizable cottage industry of
books, consultants, and other organizational coaches applying military “lessons learned” to non-
military environments). But see Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military
Relations, 35 NAT’L INTEREST 1, 3 (1994) (showing that this phenomenon would have been
largely unthinkable in the fifteen years between the American military’s ignominious withdrawal
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B. The Audit Society and the Allure of Information Management
While Boyd’s OODA loop theories were revolutionary in their mili-
tary context, their foundations began to form nearly two centuries earlier
with the emergence of industrialization and the associated growth of infor-
mation-centric organizational theory.32 The rise of bureaucracy as an effi-
cient means of organizing at scales unnecessary in agrarian society brought
with it a strong inclination toward surveillance, information processing,
and data-based planning as a means of constant management and improve-
ment, a school of thought both inspired and followed by military organiza-
tional theory.33 Weber’s theory of legitimate order and authority within a
bureaucratic structure, with its “dut[ies] without regard to personal con-
siderations,” and an “obligation to obedience,” provided the sort of mili-
tary-based organizational socialization needed—albeit with some
allowance of modification for less martial pursuits—for the management of
such modern concepts as large-scale factories, prisons, hospitals, and law
enforcement.34
Militaries of the 18th and 19th centuries were quick to adopt these
organizational innovations, which fit well with their existing hierarchical
frameworks and provided the tools to realize a modern form of military
intelligence and personnel management, which contemporary organiza-
tional models would not support.35 All of these advances were necessary to
support and maintain large armies, but military intelligence was perhaps
the biggest beneficiary of these innovations. The increasing amounts of
information necessary to make military—or, in fact, any state—decisions
in a rapidly modernizing world highlighted the importance of bureaucracy
from Vietnam and its rebuilt success in the First Gulf War. The hangover from this period
lingered through 2001 in the form of military contempt for its civilian leadership).
32. See JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECO-
NOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 7 (1986); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SO-
CIETY 969-74 (1978); Edward Higgs, The Rise of the Information State: The Development of Central
State Surveillance of the Citizen in England, 1500-2000, 14 J. Hist. Soc. 175 (2001); MICHAEL
POWER, THE AUDIT EXPLOSION (1994); Michael Power, Evaluating the Audit Explosion, 25 L. &
POL’Y. 185, 185–202 (2003).
33. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (1985). See also Ulrich
Beck, Risk Society and the Provident State, in RISK, ENVIRONMENT AND MODERNITY: TOWARD
A NEW ECOLOGY, 27 (Scott Lash et al., eds., Martin Chambers trans., 1998) (describing the
need for increased surveillance as a direct result of industrial society, when the “social, political,
ecological, and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the
control and protective institutions of industrial society.”).
34. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 330-
40 (Talcott Parsons ed., Free Press 2009) (1947).
35. The need for larger and more widely distributed militaries, driven largely by the ex-
panding imperial goals of many nations, created serious organizational problems for military
leadership. Muster lists, payroll records, logistics planning, and other forms of the modern mili-
tary’s more prosaic tasks benefited greatly from these new forms of communication and informa-
tion processing. See Higgs, supra note 32, at 178.
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as an essential tool in dealing with the modern crisis of control.36 But even
with the benefit of a modern bureaucracy, some of which already existed
within military organizations, an army’s ability to process intelligence in-
formation had been quite limited by existing technologies.37 This limita-
tion of a military organization’s ability to make informed decisions based
on “coded” intelligence information was directly dependent upon its abil-
ity to communicate, store, and process that information, described in
Weber’s concept of rationalization.38 The promise of increasingly detailed
intelligence pictures—improved “situational awareness”—generated by a
combination of the improved organizational methods of Weberian bureau-
cracy and the advances in communication, transportation, and information
processing technologies of industrialization, began to move military think-
ing toward an information-centric style of warfare.39
This quest for more information, better data processing tools, and
improved communication methods has become paradigmatic of modern
(and post-modern) society.40 This “control revolution,” as Beniger puts it,
has grown to permeate every area of society where efficiency is sought,
bringing with it a need to develop metrics for program effectiveness.41
36. Reinhard Bendix notes that any study of modern bureaucracy must acknowledge
both the challenges to and protections of individual freedoms: “[I]t is clear that these changes
are so significant in their implications for the exercise of power by a government that studies of
bureaucracy in the traditional sense do not suffice. We must search instead for the underlying
transformations in society that have prompted these developments. We must seek to interpret the
technical and social changes which affect governmental bureaucracy, not only in order to im-
prove the civil service, but in order to understand more fully the problems of power which it
involves.” Reinhard Bendix, Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power, 5 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 194, 196
(1945).
37. BENIGER, supra note 32, at 9.
38. Rationalization is the proposition that an organization’s creation and containment of
power through control can increase either through increasing the organization’s capability to
process coded information or by limiting the amount of that information to be processed. Id. at
15-16. The modern military modified this concept by maximizing both precepts: increasing
information processing capability to effectively decrease the amount of information that is
processed.
39. This is not to say that modernization has solved the military intelligence problem, of
course. Indeed, the same organizational and technological advances that have enabled the mod-
ern military intelligence framework have also yielded an increasingly complex and chaotic world
within which militaries are expected to operate. See THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE
STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Zenith Press 2006); Rathmell, supra note 15, at 87-
104.
40. See BENIGER, supra note 32, at v; Higgs, supra note 32, at 175. (1978).
41. This concept is not always as uncontroversial as it might seem on the surface. For
example, one of the chief criticisms of Utilitarianism, an early version of the information-centric
movement originally promulgated by Bentham and Mill, has been in its concentration on the
maximization of utility, which in turn requires that measurability is always an option. Such an
approach cannot apply to every human endeavor, say critics, as there are concepts like morality
and justice that defy measurement. See BENIGER, supra note 32, at 9; Bendix, supra note 36 at
196. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
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The concept of civilian police agencies is driven primarily by as the reali-
zation of a society’s social control function, and as such, makes them prime
candidates for the information-centric style of organization and
leadership.42
The quasi-military structure most police departments now adhere to
can be found in the organization of Sir Robert Peel’s London Metropoli-
tan Police in 1829, credited as the first modern civilian law enforcement
organization.43 The rapid industrialization of Europe and the United States
in the first half of the 19th century brought with it a sudden increase in the
population, much of it concentrated in urban areas.44 This caused no small
amount of concern among the upper classes, who feared disease, petty
crime, property damage, and political insurrections, just to name a few of
the phobias the ruling elite held regarding the “dangerous classes.”45 Peel,
as Chief Secretary for Ireland, introduced legislation creating paramilitary
forces to suppress Catholic and nationalist “disturbances.” Peel applied the
methods he had refined in Ireland to London and continued the use of the
military organization as a model for civilian law enforcement.46 In addi-
tion, Peel recognized that former members of the military made excellent
candidates for the role of civilian police officer, since they would arrive on
the job pre-acclimated to a quasi-military environment, and would have an
instinctive preference for hierarchy, discipline, and order.47
42. The use of the term social control function bears with it a requirement to explain its
definition in this context. Here, I refer to control in its most general sense—to influence or
direct behavior toward some predetermined goal. This definition is informed by the sociology
literature, which examines the social relationship, the organization, voluntary or compulsory
social participation, and consensual and imposed order. Hence, control, in this sense, is primarily
concerned with the two elements of influence and purpose, and control theory—in both the
sociological and mathematical senses—require facilities for the communication and processing of
information in order to manage behavior through feedback. See Richard Bellman, Control The-
ory, 211 SCI. AM. 186, 186 (1964); WILLIAM T. POWERS, BEHAVIOR: THE CONTROL OF PER-
CEPTION (1973); Jay Wright Forrester, Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision
Makers, 36 HARV. BUS. REV. 37 (1958).
43. James H. Auten, The Paramilitary Model of Police and Police Professionalism, 4 POLICE
STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 67, 67 (1981); J. L. Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829:
An Analysis of Certain Events Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in
England, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 141, 141 (1964); John M. Jermier &
Leslie J. Berkes, Leader Behavior in a Police Command Bureaucracy: A Closer Look at the Quasi-
Military Model, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 2 (1979).
44. See Lyman, supra note 43.
45. Giddens argues that the crisis of control brought about by industrialization required a
dramatic change in the state’s view of its citizens, as “no pre-modern states were able even to
approach the level of administrative coordination developed in the [modern] nation-state.”
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 57, 60-63 (1990).
46. See Tadhg O’ Ceallaigh, Peel and Police Reform in Ireland, 1814-18, 6 STUDIA
HIBERNICA 25, 26-28 (1966); See Lyman, supra note 43, at 149-150; See Auten, supra note 43, at
67.
47. There is something of a “chicken and egg” relationship between Peel’s quasi-military
organization of the London Metropolitan Police and the natural fit with former members of the
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These somewhat practical decisions cannot, however, be separated
entirely from the growth of information-centric organization theory, po-
litical economics, and surveillance technologies which were interlaced
with much of the social, political, and economic activity of industrializa-
tion and modernity. In the period from the mid-18th through the mid-
19th centuries, as industrialization in western nations began to create in-
creasingly complex systems of interdependencies between manufacturing,
capital, energy production, labor, and markets, new means of communica-
tion and control were required to take full advantage of new economies of
scale and realize productivity levels unheard of under earlier forms of man-
agement and organization.48 As Giddens points out, advances in the infor-
mation management enabled organizations to form more effective
bureaucratic structures and gave these budding bureaucracies more control
over the “timing and spacing” of human activities.49 These advances,
joined with the modern bureaucracy’s growing appetite for information
ultimately led to the surveillant assemblage as integrated into our contem-
porary concept of governance.50
In the mid-1990s, a movement among military theorists began to
develop around the concept of exploiting a technological and communica-
tions advantage to create a new kind of army, where every soldier and
piece of material was equipped with sensors that would allow direct com-
British military; was a quasi-military organizational structure selected for its qualities as best
suited for civilian policing, thus making military men (they were all men) the best candidates for
the job? Or was the choice of a quasi-military police force pre-ordained by the desired character-
istics and availability of former soldiers? The literature suggests the former, but even today, we
still see a career transition from a soldier to a civilian police officer as quite natural. See J. L.
Lyman, The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events Influencing the Passage and
Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
141, 152-53 (1964).
48. Id. at 7-10. See generally BENIGER, supra note 32. Among the innovations of industrial-
ization, perhaps the most successful is that of the modern bureaucracy. Rapid advances in manu-
facturing and transportation technologies brought an abrupt end to millennia of primarily
agricultural societies, and thus required new modes of thought around societal, economic, and
political questions. New means of social control were necessary, as the dramatic increase in trans-
actional speed brought about by industrialization quickly outpaced existing modes of control and
interaction, and began to threaten the viability of existing institutions. Beniger characterizes this
phenomenon as a “crisis of control,” a period in which a society’s organizational, information
processing, and communication capabilities are outpaced by manufacturing and transportation
technologies, resulting in a systemic loss of political and economic control which threatens ex-
isting social and governmental institutions and structures.
49. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 46-48  (University of
California Press, 2013).
50. See Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH
J. SOC. 605–622 (2000); Sean P. Hier, Probing the Surveillant Assemblage: On the Dialectics of
Surveillance Practices as Processes of Social Control, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 399 (2003), http://
www.surveillance-and-society.org. For a complete analysis of this phenomenon, see Jeffrey L.
Vagle, The History, Means, and Effects of Structural Surveillance, UNIV. OF PA. L. SCH. FAC. SCHOL-
ARSHIP 1 (2016), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1625.
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munication of information at the lowest organizational levels, but would
also pass this information up the chain of command to give military leaders
a “God’s eye view” of the battle space, allowing for even tighter OODA
loops.51 This concept, generally known as network-centric warfare, envi-
sioned the sort of information-driven military hitherto impossible, now
enabled by smaller, faster, and cheaper technology that was starting to
drive American businesses, and especially advances in networking and
communications.52 Military strategists picked up on the new style of “bot-
tom-up” management enabled through these technological advances,
where information, gathered from the very edges of an organization and
passed to leadership in near real time, could allow leaders of even the larg-
est businesses to view, analyze, and make decisions about detailed data —
actionable intelligence — that Weber, Bentham, Mill, and their contem-
poraries could only dream of.53 Following this model, an information- and
network-centric military could be more agile and aware than its adversa-
ries, thus allowing fewer troops to cover much wider geographic areas,
with less equipment, and with dynamic, ad-hoc supply chains that could
place material in the right place at the right time, a philosophy at the
center of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s wholesale “Force
Transformation” program of the early- and mid-2000s.54
The Bush administration’s focus on transforming the military
through a network-centric shift from platforms to networks, while viewed
51. See Arthur K. Cebrowski & John J. Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and
Future, 124 in U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCS. 28–35 (1998), http://mattcegelske.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/04/ncw_origin_future.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2016).
52. Id.
53. One of the better-known examples of early business adopters of this new informa-
tion-centric management style is Wal-Mart, which pioneered the concept of “precision retail-
ing.” Wal-Mart generated a competitive advantage by deploying a network of sensors throughout
all levels of the organization. This infrastructure fed real-time information through Wal-Mart’s
networks, giving them the ability to make decisions on extremely accurate and fresh data, a
concept whose usefulness was not lost on military planners. See generally DAVID S. ALBERTS,
JOHN GARSTKA & FREDERICK P. STEIN, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: DEVELOPING AND
LEVERAGING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY (1999).
54. While a full exploration of the history of Rumsfeld’s Office of Force Transformation
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is relevant and worth noting that a wide array of analysis of
the performance of the “transformed” military in Afghanistan and (especially) Iraq, led many to
observe that the optimism about a small, lighter, network-centric military was, at best, misplaced
or premature, and at worst, willfully negligent. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Groh, Network-Centric Warfare:
Leveraging the Power of Information, 1 U.S. ARMY WAR C. GUIDE TO NAT’L SECURITY ISSUES:
THEORY OF WAR & STRATEGY 323, 331-32 (2008) (enumerating some of the principle criti-
cisms and limitations of network-centric warfare); Noah Shachtman, How Technology Almost Lost
the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic, WIRED, (Nov. 27, 2007), http://
archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-12/ff_futurewar?currentPage=all (explaining
how the claims of the “Wal-Mart model” of network-centric war fighting led to understaffed
and underpowered military units on the ground); Francis Fukuyama & Abram Shulsky, Military
Organization in the Information Age: Lessons from the World of Business, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE 327-60 (1999).
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with skepticism by rank-and-file troops, was enthusiastically accepted by
the U.S. military’s civilian and political leadership, and opened up a wide
array of new business opportunities for contractors willing to help imple-
ment this vision.55 Many of these new programs concentrated on the
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveil-
lance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) space, where the true power of dis-
tributed information superiority could be fully realized.56 Key programs
quickly emerged to build survivable, robust communications and sensor
networks, information operations (IO) platforms, geospatial analysis tools,
computer-assisted targeting platforms, and unmanned intelligence gather-
ing platforms (colloquially known as drones, and later equipped with
weapons systems of their own), all of which were designed to support an
agile force far superior to the “muscle-bound and clumsy,” “industrial-age
dinosaurs” that were the legacy of outmoded Cold War thinking.57
As the U.S. military began to withdraw from their engagements in
Afghanistan and Iraq, funding streams for contractors who had tooled up
in support for network-centric warfare and force transformation also be-
gan to evaporate, and businesses looking for alternative markets for their
C4ISR platforms found a ready partner in civilian LEAs.58 Like the mili-
55. In his 2003 Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld articulated his vision for a network-centric military, and laid out the plans, and associ-
ated risks, for force transformation. See DEP’T OF DEF., SECRETARY OF DEF., OMB NO. 0704-
0188, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, (2003). The proposed transi-
tion to a “21st-century military” was sweeping, with a greater reliance on small, technology-
equipped special forces teams, and a move away from the large, heavy army divisions built up
during the Cold War. Rumsfeld estimated the initial cost of this transformation to be $24.3
billion, and $239 billion overall. Id. Later estimates, however, put the figure nearer to $1 trillion
by 2010, with program costs continuing long into the future. RUSSELL RUMBAUGH, STIMSON
CENTER, WHAT WE BOUGHT: DEFENSE PROCUREMENT FROM FY01 TO FY10, at 5 (2011).
For example, the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, expected to cost $1.5 trillion alone over the life of
the program, and has been questioned as an effective fighting platform. See David Francis, How
DOD’s $1.5 Trillion F-35 Broke the Air Force, CNBC (July 31, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/
2014/07/31/how-dods-15-trillion-f-35-broke-the-air-force. html; David Axe, Air Force Admits:
Our New Stealth Fighter Can’t Fight, DAILY BEAST, (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2015/09/17/air-force-admits-our-new-stealth-fighter-can-t-fight.html.
56. See Jeffrey L. Groh, Network-Centric Warfare: Leveraging the Power of Information, in 1
U.S. ARMY WAR C. GUIDE TO NAT’L SECURITY ISSUES: THEORY OF WAR & STRATEGY 323
(J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., 2008). See generally PETER J. DOMBROWSKI, EUGENE GHOLZ &
ANDREW L. ROSS, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AFTER NEXT
(2003).
57. John Ferris, Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution
in Military Intelligence?, 19 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 199, 203 (2004); DOMBROWSKI,
GHOLZ & ROSS, supra note 56, at 8 (2003); Steve Niva, Disappearing Violence: JSOC and the
Pentagon’s New Cartography of Networked Warfare, 44 SECURITY DIALOGUE 185, 186 (2013); Peter
J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz & Andrew L. Ross, Selling military transformation: The defense
industry and innovation, 46 ORBIS 523, 523 (2002).
58. See Peter Andreas & Richard Price, From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming
the American National Security State, 3 INT’L STUD. REV. 31–52 (2001).
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tary of the mid-1990s, police departments had also discovered the promise
of network-centricity, a concept that fit well within the quasi-military or-
ganizational structures found in most police organizations.59 Beginning in
the mid-1970s, police departments, especially those in larger U.S. cities,
began to feel political pressure to address what was widely seen as a crime
epidemic and the “downward spiral of urban decay” that accompanied a
post-industrial economic slowdown.60 The standard tactics built around
the police patrol car did not seem to be having any real success in reducing
the crime rate, and LEAs were looking for alternatives.61
In 1982, The Atlantic Monthly published an article written by two
social scientists who, after studying the tactics of police departments, con-
cluded that disorder and crime are inextricably linked, and, therefore by
addressing the petty crimes associated with community disorder — such as
loitering, vandalism, and public intoxication, “humble” crimes that were
generally considered unworthy of police attention — LEAs will, in turn,
prevent the more serious crimes from flourishing in those areas.62 The
approach became known as “broken windows policing,” named for the
tendency for buildings with a broken window to encourage further win-
dow breaking and other forms of vandalism, a phenomenon described by
Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo in his well-known abandoned car
experiment.63
Police departments in large American cities began to take an active
interest in the broken windows theory, and by the late 1980s and early
1990s, police departments in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles
had all implemented some version of this model.64 In New York, then-
mayor Rudy Giuliani introduced a version of broken windows known as
“zero-tolerance” policing, which placed a greater emphasis on the “quality
59. Id. at 38-40.
60. George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the
New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1219 (1998) (quoting WESLEY
SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF URBAN DECAY IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS 84 (1990)).
61. Id.
62. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY March
1982, at 29 (1982).
63. Zimbardo established a field study to demonstrate the effects of decaying community
on crime. In his experiment, Zimbardo “abandoned” cars in generally good condition in multi-
ple locations in the Bronx and Palo Alto. While the cars left in Palo Alto were generally reported
to police and left unmolested, the cars in the Bronx were almost immediately vandalized and
stripped of valuable parts. The key difference between these two cities, Zimbardo theorized, was
the strong sense of community in Palo Alto, where people cared about what happened in their
neighborhood, and the comparative lack of such a community sentiment in the Bronx.
Zimbardo concluded that a breakdown of shared community values could lead to a certain ano-
nymity that allowed for petty and serious crime to take hold. Diary of a Vandalized Car, TIME,
Feb. 28, 1969, at 62.
64. See Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 5, at 276.
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of life” issues that Wilson and Kelling pointed out in their original work.65
As an early adopter of the broken windows model, the New York Police
Department (NYPD) quickly discovered that any effective implementation
of such a program would require curbing disorder not only on the streets,
but also within the police department itself, which had been in a decades-
long decline of poor leadership, corruption, and an overall breakdown of
discipline.66 Addressing these (not unrelated) problems in a city the size of
New York, with a sworn police force numbering in the tens of thousands,
would require an approach that could go beyond classical organizational
techniques.67 The data- and network-centric approaches made possible by
the rapid technological advances beginning in the late 1980s and early
1990s, and implemented as a successful proof-of-concept by Wal-Mart
during this time, began to instill in the NYPD other police departments a
growing faith in algorithms and automated decision tools.68
C. Drugs, Terrorism, and the Blurring of Military and Civilian Spheres
The confluence of military and police use of data- and network-
centric approaches in their hitherto separate spheres can be traced in its
earliest forms to the war on drugs.69 As drug trafficking began to be seen
not only as a law enforcement issue, but also a threat to national security,
military and police agencies began to engage as partners in this effort,
sometimes through the exchange of ideas, sometimes quite literally,
through interagency actions.70 These activities were complicated by the
65. Giuliani’s NYPD put special emphasis on prostitution, graffiti, low-level drug of-
fenses, and “aggressive” panhandling as symptoms of urban decay and disorder. Police had largely
ignored petty offenses in all but the most extreme cases up to this point, and Giuliani promul-
gated a no-tolerance approach as a method of “reclaiming the open spaces of New York.” Judith
A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME
& DELINQ. 171, 171–73 (1999).
66. See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City Police Department’s Comp-
stat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT’L J.  POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 218, 219-20 (2006).
67. The NYPD had 31,236 full-time sworn officers in 1990. This number does not in-
clude part-time and administrative staff. BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000,
at 2 (2002).
68. See Noah Shachtman, How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks
Are Social — Not Electronic, WIRED (Nov. 27, 2007), http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/
magazine/15-12/ff_futurewar?currentPage=all; Peter K. Manning, Information Technologies and
the Police, CRIME & JUST. 349, 350 (1992). See also infra Section 0.
69. Early manifestations of police militarization took traditional forms, where military
equipment, such as assault rifles and armored personnel carriers, and their associated tactics were
adopted by civilian police departments, justified by the increased threat (real or perceived) from
drug trafficking in major U.S. cities. Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imper-
atives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 164 (2001).
70. See, e.g., EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, INST. NAT’L STRATEGIC STUD.,
JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH: THE BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTER-
AGENCY SUCCESS 3 (2011).
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fact that the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibited the use of
federal military forces for domestic law enforcement purposes.71 Congress
amended the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 to address this legal obstacle,
which allowed for military support of civilian LEAs, with the clear legisla-
tive intent that this military-law enforcement cooperation be employed in
counterdrug operations.72
Both the concept and the realization of the war on drugs have a
rather spotty record.73 The political rhetoric that tends to accompany calls
for such a war creates images of a “dangerous other,” who threatens social
stability due to lax morals and inherent inabilities to exercise self-control.74
Efforts within the war on drugs are therefore designed to “target” such
“deviant” groups within society, and by doing so, promise to reestablish
the societal values held by the upstanding citizens the laws are there to
protect.75 These words describing the dangerous other are carefully se-
lected to mask their veiled intent: to play on white fears of racial minori-
ties.76 The disproportionate effects of this war on African-Americans and
Hispanics have been well-documented, resulting in broken social struc-
tures, overcrowded prisons, and a retrenchment of Jim Crow policies (al-
beit under different names).77
A vivid example of the literal law enforcement-military partnership
in the drug war can be found in the 1988 formation of Joint Task Force-6,
now known as Joint Task Force-South (JTF-South), which combined
combat and reconnaissance forces from the Department of Defense (DoD),
intelligence services, and civilian LEAs to patrol sections of the U.S.-Mex-
ican border on drug interdiction missions.78 The regular armed border pa-
71. Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforce-
ment, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 384 (2003).
72. The 1981 Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act encouraged mil-
itary agencies to supply intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police departments. In
the 1980s and 1990s, Congress continued to expand the military’s ability to work directly with
civilian law enforcement, through such legislation as the National Defense Authorization Act,
which authorized and funded direct National Guard participation in drug operations. See
MUNSING & LAMB, supra note 70; See Kealy, supra note 71.
73. When Judge Richard Posner was asked in 1983 whether he thought the nation was
fighting a war on drugs, he responded, “I don’t know, but if we are at war, we’re losing.” When
asked if he had an alternative solution, he said, “Yes, they ought to legalize it.” William J. Bauer,
The War on Drugs, WIS. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2014).
74. Jeff Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, Race in the War on Drugs: The Social Consequences of
Presidential Rhetoric, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 874, 875-77 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Doris M. Provine, Race and Inequality in the War on Drugs, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 41, 42 (2011); Yates & Whitford, supra note 74, at 876.
77. See Provine, supra note 76, at 47, 54.
78. The circumstances of the civilian shooting by JTF-6 personnel are quite tragic, yet
should have been foreseeable under the circumstances. The shooting took place at night when
JTF-6 Marines were using night vision equipment to patrol a section of the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der. Though every Marine was armed, their explicit orders were to limit their operations to
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trols by military personnel abruptly stopped in 1997, after a young U.S.
Marine shot and killed an unarmed civilian.79 The American public’s ap-
petite for the use of military troops within its borders evaporated after this
incident, only to be revived on September 11, 2001.80
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 opened the floodgates on law enforce-
ment-military cooperation, with many of the political and legal objections
to such partnerships disappearing almost overnight. This sudden paradigm
shift, brought on by a level of terroristic violence previously unthinkable in
the United States, created an environment within which the traditionally
separate spheres of military and civilian law enforcement began to signifi-
cantly blur.81 The military contractors, large and small, that tooled up to
support the war effort — both the literal combat operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, as well as the larger, more metaphorical sense — began making
much of this material available to civilian LEAs, including machine guns,
semi-automatic shotguns, night vision equipment, sniper rifles, combat
uniforms, grenades, and high-tech surveillance gear.82 Many civilian police
departments were especially appreciative of the expansion of two DoD
programs designed to equip LEAs with military gear through the transfer
or direct purchase of material.83 Because of the highly visible nature of
military equipment such as armored personnel carriers, flash-bang gre-
nades, and sniper rifles, much of the subsequent attention from those ex-
observation and reconnaissance, relaying all suspicious activity to civilian law enforcement for
possible action. When the JTF-6 Marines thought they heard gunfire in the area, they immedi-
ately returned fire, killing a civilian. Commentators later suggested that this sort of tragedy was
inevitable, because armed marines, trained for combat, were put in a law enforcement role. JTF-
6 further exacerbated the inherent problems of military-civilian law enforcement activities
through their direct involvement in the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco,
TX. See MUNSING & LAMB, supra note 70.
79. Anti-terrorism military cooperation programs within U.S. civilian LEAs had, of
course, existed prior to the events of 9/11, with some commentators arguing that the fight
against terrorism was a far better use of military-law enforcement partnerships than the war on
drugs, since military units were better trained and equipped to address the special needs of
counter-terror operations. See Kealy, supra note 71, at 419. These early efforts remained some-
what controversial, however, even among military leaders prior to 2001. These controversies
ended quite abruptly after 9/11. As Cofer Black, the former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism
Center put it when he appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee, “[T]here was
‘before’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off.” Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the
Select S. Comm. on Intelligence and the Permanent H.R. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong.
589-94 (2004) (statement of Cofer Black, Former Chief, DCI’s Counterterrorist Center, Central
Intelligence Agency), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/joint-inquiry-intelligence-
community-activities-and-after-terrorist-attacks-september-11-0.
80. See MUNSING & LAMB, supra note 70.
81. See Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police, 30
POLICING 501, 502-11 (2007).
82. See Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 6, at 607–629.
83. See Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the Police Industrial
Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1791-92 (2015).
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amining the increased militarization of civilian police forces has been
focused on these items.84 But the use of this sort of military gear by civilian
law enforcement is largely limited to special police units and is not typi-
cally found on the average patrol officer.85 It is the widespread and in-
creased adoption by civilian police agencies of military intelligence
technologies, many of which are integrated invisibly into existing police
information and decision support tools, which likely has a more dramatic
impact across entire police departments. This invisibility, coupled with an
unproven — or misplaced — faith in these technologies, has led to a
growing system of structural surveillance that has had a disparate racial im-
pact in many cases.
II. THE EXPANSION OF ALGORITHMIC POLICING STRATEGIES
A. Early Data-Centric Efforts: Compstat and Its Kin
When then-mayor Rudy Giuliani first began implementing New
York City’s version of broken windows policing in the early 1990s, he
recognized that the disorder to be addressed could be found not only on
the city’s streets while also within the ranks of the NYPD.86 Significantly
changing the direction of an organization the size of the NYPD — as a
shift to the broken windows policing model surely required — would be a
difficult task in even the most functional of police departments, something
New York City had not had for decades.87 The organizational manage-
ment tools necessary for such an endeavor simply did not exist until ad-
vances in information technology opened up the possibility of automated,
data- and network-centric decision support systems that could take vast
amounts of raw data as input, analyze those data, and provide critical in-
sights to its human users, all within the relative blink of an eye.88 It was
84. Id; Kraska, supra note 83; Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 6; Kraska & Kappeler, supra
note 4, at 1-18.
85. While this is still true in general, there has been a disturbing trend across police de-
partments to deploy military gear more widely. This topic goes beyond the scope of this Article.
But see Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 6; Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 4, at 1-18; Rahall, supra
note 83.
86. See Kelling & Bratton, supra note 60. See also supra text accompanying note 60.
87. Id.
88. While the term big data analytics hadn’t yet made its way into our lexicon in the early
1990s, the concepts and principles therein had begun to take form. A great deal of enthusiasm
emerged for automated decision support tools, expert systems, and other data intelligence tools,
especially in military applications, where critical decisions based on unmanageable information
loads had to be made within a time span that was too short for human reasoning. See Jeung Choi,
Jae Joo & Dong Cho, Situation/Threat Assessment Fusion System (STAFS), 2 INFO. FUSION, 2002:
PROC. FIFTH INT’L CONF. 1374 (2002); Jung P. Shim et al., Past, Present, and Future of Decision
Support Technology, 33 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 111, 111-13 (2002); Heath A. Ruff, Sundaram
Narayanan & Mark H. Draper, Human Interaction with Levels of Automation and Decision-aid Fidelity
in the Supervisory Control of Multiple Simulated Unmanned Air Vehicles, 11 PRESENCE: TELEOPER-
ATORS & VIRTUAL ENV’TS 335 (2002).
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exactly this sort of system that a few forward thinkers within the NYPD
proposed as a solution to their burgeoning organizational management
problem.
In 1994, NYPD Commissioner William Bratton revealed the Comp-
stat program as a centralized solution to the department’s organizational
dilemma.89 The goal of the program was to obtain accurate, up-to-date
crime statistics at every level within the department, something that had
proven impossible up to that point.90 By requiring patrol officers to keep
records of their daily activities, including stops, arrests, and the details of
each incident, the NYPD could collect these data on a computer database,
which allowed them to generate weekly books of city-wide statistics they
could slice and dice as they saw fit: if they wanted statistics on gun crimes
specifically, or wished to compare precinct activity, they could do so with
relative ease.91 With these data and analysis tools, the NYPD could now
begin to efficiently address the city’s broken windows trouble spots, and do
so by directing the minimum amount of manpower to the right place at
the right time—exactly the outcome Giuliani and Bratton sought.92
The NYPD began to see a significant amount of success with the
Compstat system, both with their ability to address the “quality of life
crimes” highlighted by broken windows policing, as well as in their ability
to effectively manage a large and growing police force.93 This successful
adoption gave Compstat a fair amount of national publicity, and it was
touted, alongside broken windows policing, as the new paradigm of crime
prevention in the United States.94 Soon, other cities began to emulate and
adapt Compstat systems within their own police departments.95
89. There appears to be a relevant disagreement over the meaning behind the name
“Compstat”. Many authors have claimed the name is a shortening of “computer statistics,”
which Eterno and Silverman demonstrate is incorrect. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 66, at
218-31. See also Kevin J. Walsh & Vincent E. Henry, Compstat, OODA Loops and Police Perform-
ance Management, 2 POLICING 349, 349-58 (2008); James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski &
David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change
in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147–88 (2007).
90. See Eterno & Silverman, supra note 66.
91. See Eterno & Silverman, supra note 66, at 220.
92. See Willis, Mastrofski & Weisburd, supra note 89, at 189-90; see BENIGER, supra note
32, at 399-400, 407-411 (providing historical illustrations of the organizational leaps made
through bureaucratic data processing).
93. See Walsh & Henry, supra note 89, at 350-51. By 2000, the number of full-time sworn
officers in the NYPD rose to 40,435. BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000, at 2
(2002).
94. See David Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem Solving in
American Policing, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 421, 422 (2002).
95. See Willis, Mastrofski & Weisburd, supra note 89, at 189-90; see BENIGER supra note
32, at 399-400, 407-411.
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With the early success of Compstat also came a redoubled faith in the
possibilities of automated law enforcement intelligence systems, allowing
police departments to do more with less.96 As police departments became
increasingly convinced that the broken windows model of policing, with
its dynamic, problem-oriented approach, would replace the old, static bu-
reaucratic model that police agencies had relied on for generations, they
began to accept and explore more deeply the managerial tools and tech-
niques offered by algorithmic, data-driven systems.97 This new thinking
sparked a flurry of data- and network-centric experiments in LEAs around
the world, and revived a global interest in an intelligence-based model of
policing that had been deployed by British police departments since the
1980s.98
B. The Rise of Intelligence-Led Policing
The British model of “intelligence-led policing” was developed in
part as a response to the privatization initiatives in the UK in the 1980s and
1990s, where portions of government services were either taken over by
private companies or adopted a private business model within their organi-
zations, effectively becoming quasi-private agencies.99 The British Na-
tional Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), originally organized to
address drug trafficking, and later expanded to include organized crime
generally, adopted a business data processing model to develop the Na-
tional Intelligence Model (NIM), a nationwide system for use by all police
agencies across the UK, replacing their existing bureaucratic management
processes with an intelligence-led policing model.100 This model had been
developed by British authorities to mimic the traditional military intelli-
gence model, where data are collected and analyzed in order to identify
patterns and generate actionable intelligence to best prioritize the deploy-
ment of patrols based on a set of problem-oriented goals.101
96. In 1996, the Compstat system was given the Innovations in American Government
Award, a prestigious honor granted by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government. William F. Walsh, Compstat: An Analysis of an Emerging Police
Managerial Paradigm, 24 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGY & MGMT. 347, 347 (2001).
97. Id. at 356-58.
98. See David L. Carter & Jeremy G. Carter, Intelligence-Led Policing: Conceptual and Func-
tional Considerations for Public Policy, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 310–25 (2009) (explaining the
history of data-led policing as a paradigm in the UK and US).
99. Id. at 311.
100. Id. at 313-15.
101. One can see very similar lines of thinking between the British intelligence-led polic-
ing model and the American Compstat model, where automated systems backed by advanced
technology would deliver the “right information . . .to the right people at the right time.” Nina
Cope, Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?: Integrating Volume Crime Analysis into
Policing, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 188, 191 (2004). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this almost exactly
echoes the oft-stated goals for the military’s network-centric warfare transformation, where the
goal is “getting the right information, faster, to the right forces—who in turn can take the right
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It is not difficult to see the allure of such a system. The combination
of tightening budgets, increased public concern over crime and disorder,
and a rising perception that the world had become a more dangerous place
(due in large part to drug trafficking, terrorism, and a general breakdown
of civil order) created an environment that made automated solutions to
these problems all the more credible. Rapid advances in technology and
research into data mining and automated, intelligent decision support sys-
tems began to instill in police departments a newfound enthusiasm for
technology not generally seen since the days of Sputnik and the space race.
Researchers began looking for existing mathematical and physical models,
which could provide even faster and more accurate intelligence.102 By the
late 1990s, police departments began to consider the possibility that intelli-
gence-led policing, coupled with advanced technologies and analytical
tools, could move LEAs beyond mere crime fighting and into the realm of
crime prevention.103
C. The Tantalizing Prospect of Predictive Policing
Organizations seeking to tighten their respective OODA loops have
followed Boyd’s logic to an inevitable conclusion: Instead of merely seek-
ing further methods to tighten the OODA loop, they find ways to tighten
the loop to a point where it has “inverted into itself”—that is, the decision
cycle becomes predictive, rather than reactive.104 The possibility of prevent-
action, faster, against the right objective.” JOHN LUDDY, LEXINGTON INST., THE CHALLENGE
AND PROMISE OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 3 (2005), http://lex2015.borczdixon.com/
wp-content/uploads/challenge-promise-network-centric-warfare.pdf.
102. This analytical method was not necessarily new in the 1990s, since Boyd and others
had been applying these techniques since the 1950s, albeit without the benefit of the technology
available to analysts and researchers toward the end of the 20th century. But because of these new
technological tools, methods that required a great deal of processing power were now available
outside of supercomputing centers. Complicated models and techniques such as simulated an-
nealing were explored for their ability to arrive at solutions through complex analytical methods.
See Steven J. D’Amico et al., A simulated Annealing Approach to Police District Design, 29 COM-
PUTERS & OPERATIONS RES. 667–684 (2002).
103. See Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-
Mart and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession, 76 POLICE CHIEF 18 (2009); Beth Pearsall,
Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement, 266 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 16–19 (2010).
104. Mathematical modeling has long been employed in this manner, using data-fed simu-
lations to mimic or predict real-world phenomena. Statistical methods such as Bayesian analysis
and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations have driven enormous advances in the
fields of computer science, theoretical and applied physics, and the social sciences. See Adrian F.
M. Smith & Gareth O. Roberts, Bayesian Computation via the Gibbs Sampler and Related Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Methods, 55 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 3 (1993); Bradley P. Carlin & Siddhartha
Chib, Bayesian Model Choice via Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y
473–484 (1995). These and related methods have been combined with research in information
theory, decision theory, and neural networks to create successful extrapolation and predictive
systems across a wide range of fields and problems. See CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN
RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING (Michael Jordan et al. eds., 2006).
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ing crime before it actually happens has been the Holy Grail of police
departments, especially when local, state, and federal governments were
actively looking for ways to cut back on police budgets.105 The apparent
successes of broken windows and zero tolerance policing backed by sophis-
ticated decision support systems like Compstat and intelligence-led polic-
ing, gave many in law enforcement the firm belief that these systems and
methodologies would eventually yield tools that would collect the massive
amounts of data now available from inside and outside of police depart-
ments, swiftly store and analyze those data, and produce results “to antici-
pate, prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.”106
A common trope among police department is that an experienced
and talented officer can apply their knowledge and analytical skills to attain
an imperfect version of predictive policing, but that the model does not
scale well.107 The benefit these new analytical tools and methods could
bring to these officers could mean the difference between investigating a
crime that just occurred versus preventing the crime from happening in
the first place.108 The savings to society in administrative costs, property
damage, and human lives alone make this a worthy goal for a data- and
network-centric police force.
But for such a police intelligence system to work as advertised, one
needs to provide it with as much good data as possible from as broad a
sampling as possible so that the pattern recognition models can achieve the
nearest thing to a God’s eye view, thus allowing the analyst to find the
proverbial needle in the haystack.109 This means police agencies need to
turn to nontraditional sources of information, such as social media, as well
as developing and refining internal data sources.110 The risks inherent in
such an approach—especially if implementation or strategy is rushed or
otherwise undertaken without a full understanding of the implications—
can include not only the more obvious issues of privacy and fairness, but
also technical liabilities attributable to cyber security and the long-term
effects on due process, all of which present serious ethical questions and
responsibilities.111
105. See Beck & McCue, supra note 103, at 16–19.
106. Pearsall, supra note 103, at 16.
107. See Cope, supra note 101.
108. See Samuel Greengard, Policing the Future, 55 COMM. ACM 19 (Mar. 2012).
109. See Pearsall, supra note 103, at 16-19. For those who have followed the national secur-
ity version of this debate, this logical progression will seem quite familiar. In government hear-
ings across Europe and America, intelligence agencies have argued that in order to find needles,
they need access to the entire data haystack. See Patrick Wintour, New Spying Legislation is
Needed, Intelligence Committee Will Say, THE GUARDIAN, (March 12, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/12/ intelligence-committee-to-report-new-spying-
legislation-is-needed.
110. See Pearsall, supra note 103, at 17.
111. See, e.g., K. Krasnow Waterman & Paula J. Bruening, Big Data analytics: Risks and
Responsibilities, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 89 (2014). The ethical considerations inherent in big
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III. THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRUCTURAL SURVEILLANCE
AND DE FACTO RACE BIAS
A. Criticisms of the Broken Windows Policing Model
The broken windows policing model, along with the collection of
technologies and techniques supporting this approach, have met with a
growing body of criticisms, even as police departments continue to adopt
and promote these methods.112 Central to many of these criticisms is the
core role that “disorder” plays in the broken windows model, specifically,
the subjective definition and measurement of the term, as well as the lim-
ited beneficiaries of this approach.113 These criticisms have seriously ques-
tioned the premise of broken windows, citing statistics that indicate that
the broken windows model has a measurable, direct negative effect on the
very neighborhoods and communities whose “hot spots” were supposedly
the beneficiaries of increased police focus.114
Among the sharpest critiques of the broken windows policing model
is that, whatever the original intent was of such programs, their implemen-
tations have been less about policing disorder than about the control of
poor neighborhoods and poor people, most of whom are racial minori-
ties.115 The longstanding practice within the American legal system of us-
data analysis are not mere academic exercises. The use of algorithmic and data-centric tools by
civilian police departments, coupled with our natural tendency toward automation bias (see Sec-
tion 0), can yield very real consequences to those on the wrong end of the equation. See, e.g.,
Angwin et. al, supra note 1.
112. As crime rates began to drop in cities like New York in the late 1990s, proponents of
broken windows policing claimed this as evidence that this new policing paradigm was working.
See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New York
City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 1217, 1217 (1998). In fact, the drop in crime rates
in New York City was double the national average at the time. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367-68 (1997). Critics of the broken win-
dows model, however, argued that its proponents were too quick to claim responsibility for the
drop in crime rates, asserting that other factors are just as likely, or more likely, to explain the
decline, such as more favorable economic conditions, shifts in drug use, and the general increase
in the New York police force. See, e.g., Joshua C. Hinkle & David Weisburd, The Irony of Broken
Windows Policing, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 503 (2008); Joshua C. Hinkle & Sue-Ming Yang, A New
Look into Broken Windows: What Shapes Individuals’ Perceptions of Social Disorder?, 42 J. CRIM.
JUST. 26 (2014); Aaron R. S. Lorenz, The Windows Remain Broken: How Zero Tolerance Destroyed
Due Process, 12 PUB. INTEGRITY 247 (2010).
113. See Jacinta M. Gau & Travis C. Pratt, Revisiting Broken Windows Theory: Examining the
Sources of the Discriminant Validity of Perceived Disorder and Crime, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 758, 758
(2010); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 292 (1998).
114. See, e.g., Gau & Pratt, supra note 113; Hinkle & Weisburd, supra note 112.
115. Empirical evidence collected in cities that have implemented versions of broken win-
dows policing strongly indicates a race bias in the execution of the policy. See Jeffrey Fagan &
Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City, 28
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457, 458 (2000); Mike King, “Broken Windows,” Urban Policing, and the
Social Contexts of Race and Neighborhood (Dis-)Empowerment, 21 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 533,
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ing race as a signal of increased risk of criminal behavior combined with
programs encouraging police officers to gather “intelligence” data through
arbitrary stop and frisk programs (sometimes referred to as “enhanced Terry
stops”) to feed into automated intelligence systems, has created an environ-
ment where racial minorities end up bearing the costs of broken windows,
while wealthy, White communities tend to see the majority of its bene-
fits.116 The social disorder that broken windows policing targets has been
shown to be a very fluid concept, where the perceptions of a minority
neighborhood’s residents are often far different than those of the police
officers patrolling those neighborhoods, who frequently come from other,
wealthier neighborhoods.117
The result of the intelligence data collected based on race or class
bias, or parochial perceptions of social disorder, creates an inherent bias in
automated decision support systems that tends to be reinforced with every
trip around the OODA loop.118 This result can be directly traced to the
sort of feedback loops data-centric decision support systems like Compstat
are prone to encounter.119 That is, if the data used to initiate an automated
decision support tool is biased or otherwise flawed, the “actionable intelli-
gence” that emerges will likely also be biased or flawed. If this bad intelli-
gence is then acted upon, the resulting stops or arrests will likely generate
even more bad data, which is then fed back into the decision support sys-
tem, and so on.120
535 (2013); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma
and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 321 (2004); Forrest
Stuart, Race, Space, and the Regulation of Surplus Labor: Policing African Americans in Los Angeles’s
Skid Row, 13 SOULS 197, 206 (2011).
116. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, supra note 115. It is worth noting that Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), which allowed a police officer’s “professional judgment” to serve as the basis
for warrantless stops and searches, involves a race-based decision by a police officer. Specifically,
Detective McFadden, who was White, stopped the defendant, Terry, who was African-Ameri-
can, based on McFadden’s sole observation that Terry was seen in a commercial district far from
an area of the city where most African Americans lived. McFadden stated Terry’s presence
“didn’t look right to [him] at the time.”
117. See Joshua C. Hinkle & Sue-Ming Yang, A New Look into Broken Windows: What
Shapes Individuals’ Perceptions of Social Disorder?, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 26, 33 (2014).
118. Some officers within police organizations have also expressed levels of dissatisfaction
with algorithmic tools like Compstat, indicating that the pressures on lower-level officers within
departments from upper management result in a system of perverse incentives, where the rank-
and-file tend to be rewarded only if they continue to propagate and support the system’s existing
structure. See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, Understanding Police Management: A Typology of
the Underside of Compstat, 5 PROF. ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 11, 14-16 (2010).
119. Negative feedback loops in police decision support tools have been a concern for
some time, especially if data collection processes are not updated to fit the goals of the commu-
nity. See James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Recommendations for
Integrating Compstat and Community Policing, 4 POLICING 182, 189-91 (2010).
120. See, e.g., Thomas Oommen, Laurie G. Baise & Richard M. Vogel, Sampling Bias and
Class Imbalance in Maximum-Likelihood Logistic Regression, 43 MATHEMATICAL GEOSCIENCES 99,
118 (2010); CHRISTOPHER M BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING
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B. Algorithms, Data, Neutrality, and Bias
What makes automated, predictive policing systems an attractive as a
solution for LEAs seeking to increase efficiency is the same aspect that
makes them potentially dangerous: We tend to implicitly trust algorithms
and data since we assume that computers have no bias, and numbers do not
lie.121 This common misconception is based on two fundamental misun-
derstandings of automated decision support or expert systems. First, while
it is true that computers, as finite state machines that at their core (no pun
intended) are strictly limited to the instructions we give them through
their programming, it does not follow that the algorithms we run on these
computers are necessarily unbiased. Computer programs—algorithms
coded by humans into a form a computer’s chipset can interpret—are
written with the objectives, design choices, and general experiences of the
programmer as background. The series of instructions, data structures, and
design choices that end up in a finished computer program can often trans-
late subtle biases, often in unexpected ways.122
For example, from an algorithmic modeling perspective, incorrect or
imbalanced input data has long been shown to lead to biased results.123
Perhaps the most commonly used statistical method in predictive modeling
systems is linear regression,124 particularly a maximum likelihood linear
(Michael Jordan et al. eds., 2006); Brian Mac Namee et al., The problem of Bias in Training Data in
Regression Problems in Medical Decision Support, 24 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MEDICINE 51, 54
(2002).
121. See J. Elin Bahner, Anke-Dorothea Hüper & Dietrich Manzey, Misuse of Automated
Decision Aids: Complacency, Automation Bias and the Impact of Training Experience, 66 INT’L J.
HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 688, 688–690 (2008); Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen L. Mosier & Mark
Burdick, Does Automation Bias Decision-making? 51 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 991, 993
(1999).
122. This concept has been generalized into what are known as the “no free lunch” (NFL)
theorems, which state that bias-free learning is futile. For a detailed description—conceptually
and mathematically—of these theorems, see David H. Wolpert & William G. Macready, No Free
Lunch Theorems for Optimization, 1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
67 (1997). See also David H. Wolpert & William G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorems for
Search 3-5 (Feb. 6, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Sante Fe Institute).
123. The problems of unbalanced data have long been recognized in various fields, such as
statistics and econometrics, where a number of novel approaches have been proposed to account
for the data imbalance. See, e.g., S. R. Cosslett, Maximum Likelihood Estimator for Choice-Based
Samples, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1289 (1981); Vicente Garcı́a, Ramón Alberto Mollineda & José
Salvador Sánchez, On the k-NN Performance in a Challenging Scenario of Imbalance and Overlapping,
11 PATTERN ANALYSIS & APPLICATIONS 269 (2007); Xu-Ying Liu, Jianxin Wu & Zhi-Hua
Zhou, Exploratory Undersampling For Class-Imbalance Learning, 39 IEEE TRANSACTIONS SYS.,
MAN., & CYBERNETICS, PART B (CYBERNETICS) 539 (2009); Yuchun Tang et al., Correspon-
dence, SVMs Modeling for Highly Imbalanced Classification, 39 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS.,
MAN., & CYBERNETICS, PART B (CYBERNETICS) 281 (2009); David P. Williams, Miranda S.
Silvious Vincent Myers, Mine Classification with Imbalanced Data, 6 IEEE GEOSCIENCE & RE-
MOTE SENSING LETTERS 528 (2009).
124. Logistic regression, a variant of statistical linear regression used when the dependent
variable is not continuous but is instead a binary value (e.g., “yes/no”), is often used to predict
FALL 2016] Tightening the OODA Loop 127
regression, which is a widely used technique in military and police predic-
tive intelligence systems.125 In systems such as these, the data used often
contain a large number of events belonging to one class, while the other
class contains only a few data points, a data disparity known as a class im-
balance.126 This phenomenon often occurs in data where the event of in-
terest (the crime) is sampled far more frequently than non-events.127 This
problem also manifests itself in the differences in class data representations
between the sample set and the actual population, known as sampling
bias.128 There are, of course, statistical sampling methods to mitigate these
effects, but there is no clear consensus as to which method of class distribu-
tion sampling will work best in all—or even most—situations.129 The best
solutions tend to be those that are specially selected based on such factors
as the statistical methods employed, the population size, the sample size,
and specifics regarding the event in question.130 In plain language, this
means that a one-size-fits-all solution is likely to produce questionable re-
sults, at best, and at worst, dangerously biased results. This danger becomes
the probability of an event on a range from 0 to 1. ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANAL-
YSIS 115-116 (2013).
125. See Gary King & Langche Zeng, Explaining Rare Events in International Relations, 55
INT’L ORG. 693, 697 (2001); Jacqueline Cohen, Wilpen L. Gorr & Andreas M. Olligschlaeger,
Leading Indicators and Spatial Interactions: A Crime-forecasting Model for Proactive Police Deployment,
39 GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 105 (2007); MAPPING AND ANALYSING CRIME DATA (Alex
Hirschfield & Kate Bowers, eds., CRC Press 2003); THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MINING 567 (Tansel Özyer et al. eds., 2013).
126. See George Forman, Quantifying Trends Accurately Despite Classifier Error and Class Im-
balance, in PROC. 12TH ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE, DISCOVERY & DATA
MINING 160 (2006). See also Thomas Oommen, Laurie G Baise & Richard M. Vogel, Sampling
Bias and Class Imbalance in Maximum-likelihood Logistic Regression, 43 MATHEMATICAL GEOSCI-
ENCES 99, 200 (2010).
127. Sampling bias occurs when researchers rely heavily on records that contain more com-
plete or relevant data, which creates a bias toward those people or events that are the primary
subject of the study, as they tend to have higher degrees of data sufficiency and are more likely to
be included. For example, hidden bias tends to show up when studying diseases, because sicker
patients tend to have more data. See, e.g., Alexander Rusanov et al., Hidden in Plain Sight: Bias
Towards Sick Patients When Sampling Patients With Sufficient Electronic Health Record Data For Re-
search, 14 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 1, 1-2 (2014).
128. See, e.g., Hui Zhou & Wencal Du, Studying the Sampling Bias of Network Topology
Discovery, 15 INT’L INFO. INST. 193 (2012); KENNETH P. BURNHAM & DAVID R. ANDERSON,
MODEL SELECTION AND INFERENCE: A PRACTICAL INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH
32-35 (2nd ed. 2013); David A. Freedman, David Collier & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, STATISTICAL
MODELS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE: A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 29 (2010); Yoav
Freund, László Györfi & György Turán, Sample Selection Bias Correction Theory, in ALGORITHMIC
LEARNING THEORY (Yoav Freund et al. eds., 2008); PAUL GUSTAFSON, MEASUREMENT ER-
ROR AND MISCLASSIFICATION IN STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY: IMPACTS AND BAYESIAN
ADJUSTMENTS 22-24 (2003).
129. See Gary M. Weiss & Foster Provost, Learning When Training Data are Costly: The Effect
of Class Distribution on Tree Induction, 19 J. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RES. 315 (2003).
130. See Oommen, supra note 120, at 118.
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increasingly amplified when one examines the trend of police analysis be-
ing extended from the realm of geospatial analysis—predicting which
neighborhoods are most likely to be crime hot spots—to the individual,
where police keep close tabs on people who, according to predictive algo-
rithms, are more likely to be involved in future crimes.131
C. The Introduction of Automation Bias
The rise of the information and audit society and the associated in-
crease in the use of automated information systems in organizational deci-
sion making often leads to an overreliance on—and overconfidence in—
the results of these systems. This automation bias leads to misuse of auto-
mated intelligence systems combined with automation-induced user com-
placency.132 The negative effects of this automation bias have been seen in
healthcare, transportation, power distribution, defense, and space explora-
tion, often with serious, life-threatening consequences.133 There are mul-
tiple reasons for this behavior, including our natural tendencies to seek out
paths of least cognitive effort, to expend less energy when part of a team
(including teams with automated members), and to treat computers as de-
cision-making authorities.134 These errors have been further categorized
into two classes that manifest in automated environments: omission errors,
where operators fail to respond to system anomalies because the automated
system fails to detect or warn of them; and commission errors, where users
131. See John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely
to Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/po-
lice-program-aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html.
132. See Eugenio Alberdi et al., Why Are People’s Decisions Sometimes Worse With Computer
Support?, 5775 COMPUTER SAFETY 18, 19 (2009); J. Elin Bahner, Monika F. Elepfandt & Die-
trich Manzey, Misuse of Diagnostic Aids in Process Control: The Effects of Automation Misses on Com-
placency and Automation Bias, 52 PROC. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y 52ND ANN.
MEETING 1330, 1330 (2008); See John D. Lee & Katrina A. See, Trust in Automation: Designing
for Appropriate Reliance, 46 HUM. FACTORS 50, 76 (2004).
133. See Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen Mosier & Mark D. Burdick, Accountability and Automa-
tion Bias, 52 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 701 (2000); Mark D. Burdick et al., The Amelio-
rating Effects of Accountability on Automation Bias, in THIRD ANN. SYMP. ON HUM. INTERACTION
WITH COMPLEX SYS. HICS ‘96, at 142 (1996); Kate Goddard, Abdul Roudsari & Jeremy C.
Wyatt, Automation Bias: Empirical Results Assessing Influencing Factors, 83 INT’L J. MED. IN-
FORMATICS 368 (2014); John D. Lee & Katrina A. See, Trust in Automation: Designing for Appro-
priate Reliance, 46 HUM. FACTORS 50 (2004).
134. In addition to empirical studies on this topic, scholars have collected a number of
anecdotal examples of this phenomenon to better illustrate the point. One of the earliest identi-
fied examples of this can be found in the 1983 Korean Airlines (KAL) incident, in which Soviet
fighters shot down a passenger aircraft. Forensic examinations and experiments showed that the
KAL crew had grown complacent in their reliance on the aircraft’s automated navigation sys-
tems, and followed the systems’ recommended headings rather than cross-checking its results
against other navigation methods, as is typically required. Due to the crew’s lack of vigilance and
deep trust in the automated systems, the flight path given by the automated navigation systems
led the crew into Soviet airspace. See Skitka et al., Does Automation Bias Decision-making?, supra
note 121, at 992.
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blindly follow incorrect guidance from automated systems in spite of con-
traindications from other information sources.135 Studies have repeatedly
shown that automation bias of both types leads to users making incorrect
decisions at a rate as high as 75%, even when the information they needed
to make the correct decision was readily available.136
Automation bias becomes especially dangerous when life or liberty is
at stake. Multiple studies in domains such as health care, air transportation,
and military command and control have repeatedly shown how bias and
complacency lead users of automated systems to make very costly mis-
takes.137 In military environments especially, overconfidence in the au-
thority of automated decision support systems can be particularly
catastrophic, where the importance of situational awareness is para-
mount.138 The average person is well equipped to engage in naturalistic
decision-making processes, where one is expected to solve real-world
problems under a certain amount of stress.139 We are, however, prone to
overreliance on sources of information that we regard as authoritative.140
Military intelligent decision support systems operate within organizational
hierarchies wherein users are predisposed, through their training, to defer
to authorities within their supervisory structure, a trait that remains in
effect when users of these systems seek guidance from algorithms and data
structures.141 The natural result is an amplification of automation bias in
these overtly hierarchical environments, where users exhibit tendencies to
rely exclusively on automated systems, even when conflicting information
135. See Skitka et al., Accountability and Automation Bias, supra note 136, at 702; see Skitka et
al., Does Automation Bias Decision-making?, supra note 121, at 993.
136. See Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen Mosier & Mark D. Burdick, Accountability and Automa-
tion Bias, 51 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 701, 702 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Raja Parasuraman & Dietrich H. Manzey, Complacency and Bias in Human
Use of Automation: An Attentional Integration, 52 HUM. FACTORS 381 (2010); Robert J. de Boer,
Wijnand Heems & Karel Hurts, The Duration of Automation Bias in a Realistic Setting, 24 INT’L J.
AVIATION PSYCHOL. 287 (2014); John M. McGuirl & Nadine B. Sarter, Supporting Ttrust Cali-
bration and the Effective Use of Decision Aids by Presenting Dynamic System Confidence Information, 48
HUM. FACTORS 656 (2006); Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, The Debate over Autonomous
Weapons Systems, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 25 (2015); Erika Rovira & Kathleen McGarry &
Rajaj Paasuraman, Effects of Imperfect Automation on Decision Making in a Simulated Command and
Control Task, 49 HUM. FACTORS 76 (2007); William M. Crocoll & Bruce G. Coury, Status or
Recommendation: Selecting the Type of Information for Decision Aiding, 34 PROC. HUM. FACTORS
SOC’Y 1524 (1990); Mary L. Cummings, Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Sup-
port Systems, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, AIAA 1ST INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
TECHNICAL CONF. 1 (2004).
138. See Erika Rovira, et al., Effects of Imperfect Automation on DecisionMmaking in a Simulat-
edCcommand and Control Task, 49 HUM. FACTORS 76 (2007).
139. See Gary Klein, Naturalistic Decision Making, 50 HUM. FACTORS 456 (2008).
140. See Mary L. Cummings, Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support
Systems, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, AIAA 1ST INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS TECH-
NICAL CONF. (2004).
141. Id.
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is presented by other available systems.142 The transfer of military intelli-
gent decision support systems to civilian law enforcement organizations,
where the paramilitary organizational structure closely resembles that of
the military, makes police susceptible to the same dangerous automation
bias exhibited in military environments. So how do law enforcement orga-
nizations take advantage of continued advances in automated intelligence
and decision support techniques without either further alienating the
communities they serve or succumbing to various data- and algorithm-
based biases?
IV. A COMMUNITY POLICING SOLUTION TO
ALGORITHMIC RACE BIAS
Of course, to completely ignore the opportunities presented by ad-
vances in automation makes no sense. There are many tasks that computers
simply do better than humans, such as repetitive tasks, rapid response to
control tasks, rule-based deductive reasoning, and simultaneous task han-
dling.143 As our systems—both human and computer—grow increasingly
complex, we need automation to give us the enhanced capabilities to han-
dle time-critical and complex control environments. The trick, then, is to
recognize the critical role automated information systems play in these do-
mains, but at the same time, maintain an informed awareness of the pitfalls
an overreliance on automated decision support can bring. This is of great
importance to LEAs, who have a special duty to their communities, not
only to enforce the laws but also to protect and maintain the health and
safety of everyone in those communities. Allocating the appropriate
amount of functionality between police officers and automated systems is
critical to this role. In this Section, I recommend a two-element approach
to this problem that takes into account both the important social role po-
lice play within their communities as well as the phenomenon of automa-
tion and data bias that can artificially reinforce racial disparities in police
treatment.
A. A Return to the Original Intent of Community Policing
A significant part of the original broken windows policing concept
articulated by Wilson and Kelling was the role of the police officer in reas-
suring community members of their safety, and maintaining a high degree
of sensitivity to signaling by community residents, with respect not only to
criminal activity, but also with their comfort with the police agency it-
142. See Erika Rovira, et al., Effects of Imperfect Automation on Decision Making in a Simulated
Command and Control Task, 49 HUM. FACTORS 76 (2007).
143. See Mary L. Cummings, Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support
Systems, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, AIAA 1ST INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS TECH-
NICAL CONF. 1 (2004). .
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self.144 Community policing requires a more holistic approach to the prob-
lem of public safety that goes beyond mere crime fighting to encompass
overall community health, safety, and quality of life.145 Under this model,
crime fighting was not an end in itself, but the means toward healthier
communities, and was seen as a more modern, inclusive method of
policing.146
Too many implementations of broken windows and intelligence-led
policing models, however, failed to follow through on this part of the the-
ory. Rather than measure their performance—and direct their activities—
using data that reflected a community’s overall health and quality of life,
systems like Compstat relied heavily, sometimes exclusively, on traditional
crime statistics, such as the number of stops, arrests, and clearance rates,
despite the fact that these metrics have repeatedly been shown to have little
to no bearing on overall community safety.147 Sadly, this flawed approach
to the original community-policing concept originates in the fact that
these crime statistics are easy to collect and measure, and police depart-
ments have developed a high degree of comfort with these metrics over
the years.148 Thus, the most direct approach to solving the problem of bad
data leading to biased results from data-centric decision support tools is to
require that police departments retool their data collection and analysis
efforts toward more meaningful metrics.
Another misinterpreted requirement of the original Wilson and Kel-
ling model is the concept of proactive policing. Most police departments
implementing broken windows models have designed their systems as inci-
dent-oriented frameworks, which do a poor job at addressing levels of
criminality in a community and serve mainly to feed a cycle of incarcera-
tion.149 The Wilson and Kelling method of proactive policing focuses in-
stead on the root causes of criminality, such as poverty, economic and
144. See P.A.J. Waddington, Community Policing, 1 POLICING 129, 129–131 (2007).
145. See David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, Issues and Perspectives of Law Enforcement Accredi-
tation: A National Study of Police Chiefs, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 195 (1994); GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING
CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1997); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN
CHICAGO: A TALE OF THREE CITIES (2006).
146. Id.
147. See PETER W. GREENWOOD, JOAN PETERSILIA & JAN M. CHAIKEN, THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION PROCESS 57-58 (1975); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (2011).
148. See VICTOR E. KAPPELER & LARRY K. GAINES, COMMUNITY POLICING: A CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 180 (2012).
149. See Mike King, “Broken Windows,” Urban Policing, and the Social Contexts of Race and
Neighborhood (Dis-)Empowerment, 21 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 533 (2013) (reviewing ROBERT
SAMPSON, “GREAT AMERICAN CITY” (2012)); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Win-
dows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 333 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael
D. White eds., New York University Press 2009).
132 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 22:101
ecological injustice, and racism, where police departments form part of a
larger community team to go beyond the punishing of window breakers,
and actually fix the broken windows.150
Finally, community policing requires police departments to hone
their sensitivities to cultural norms and the needs of the community, since
perceptions of social disorder can be highly dependent upon time, place,
and circumstance, and most police officers are not residents of the commu-
nities they patrol.151 Public perceptions can also vary by context, which
means social disorder often falls into the “I can’t define it, but I know it
when I see it” category.152 When police officers develop a feel for their
communities they patrol, they will also benefit their departments by pro-
viding better, more meaningful intelligence data, which can then be used
to improve their decision support outcomes.153
Police department policies and procedures that are put in place with
automated decision support tools like Compstat, which supports the bro-
ken windows policing regimes, have had a distinctly negative effect on
minority communities.154 As discussed in Section III above, this problem is
not a new one, but is instead one that has been exacerbated by the use of
military tactics and technologies.155 LEAs, already obligated to collect evi-
dence, especially feel the pressure in information societies to observe, col-
lect, record, and evaluate all available data.156 This predilection leads police
to treat their communities as intelligence landscapes and people as “data
150. Wesley G. Skogan, Broken Windows: Why—and How—We Should Take Them Seriously,
7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 195, 198–200 (2008).
151. See William J. Chambliss, Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law
Enforcement, 41 SOC. PROBS. 177–81 (1994).
152. See Joshua C. Hinkle & Sue-Ming Yang, A New Look into Broken Windows: What
Shapes Individuals’ Perceptions of Social Disorder?, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 26 (2014); Robert J. Sampson
& Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of
“Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004); Ioanna Gouseti & Jonathan Jackson, Con-
strual Level Theory and the Fear of Crime, in PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME, FEAR AND THE MEDIA 22
(Derek Chadee ed., 2016).
153. Craig Paterson, ‘Street-level Surveillance’: Human Agency and the Electronic Monitoring of
Offenders, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 314 (2007); William J. Bratton & Sean W. Malinowski,
Police Performance Management in Practice: Taking COMPSTAT to the Next Level, 2 POLICING 259,
259–65 (2008).
154. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457 (2000); Yili Xu et al., Discover-
ing the Impact of Community Policing: The Broken Windows Thesis, Collective Efficacy, and Citizens’
Judgment, 42 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 147 (2005).
155. See Richard L. Block, Fear of Crime and Fear of the Police, 19 SOC. PROBS.  91 (1971);
William Bloss, Escalating US Police Surveillance After 9/11: An Examination of Causes and Effects, 4
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 208 (2007); Peter B. Kraska, supra note 84; Peter B. Kraska & Louis J.
Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense of American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUST.
Q. 607 (1997).
156. See Michael Power, Evaluating the Audit Explosion, 25 LAW & POL’Y 185, 187-
89(2003).
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elements,”157 resulting in dissociative or adversarial relationships between
cop and citizen.158
This result is counter to the original intent behind community polic-
ing.159 In hindsight, there is a certain level of disconnect between the al-
gorithmic policing model and the community policing model, since
algorithmic policing seeks to build a centralized, automated police force
that operates from the inside out, while the community policing model
requires a process that begins and ends with the citizen.160 But a key driver
behind broken windows and algorithmic policing is a heightened fear of
crime and disorder, a fear that has not diminished significantly over the
past few decades, despite the nearly universal drop in crime rates nation-
ally.161 A necessary part of this transformation, therefore, is to cultivate a
base level of trust within police organizations as well as stakeholder com-
munities. One method of building this trust is to continue to use the auto-
mated policing systems while redesigning them to focus on local
157. See Craig Willse, “Universal Data Elements,” or the Biopolitical Life of Homeless Popula-
tions, 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 227 (2008) (describing how homeless populations are quantified
as data elements).
158. See Alistair Fraser & Colin Atkinson, Making Up Gangs: Looping, Labelling and the New
Politics of Intelligence-led Policing, 14 YOUTH JUST. 154, 166–67 (2014) (“The cops most of the
time tend to put this information into the [intelligence] database and then we use our judgment
maybe to put them in [a gang] or not.”); Craig Paterson, ‘Street-Level Surveillance’: Human
Agency and the Electronic Monitoring of Offenders, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 314 (2007) (discussing
the adversarial relations between electronically monitored offenders and their monitoring
officials).
159. As originally envisioned in the early 1970s, the core community policing concept
requires police officers to develop a sensitivity to community signaling regarding crime and dis-
order. Under this theory, this can only be done by establishing police foot patrols in neighbor-
hoods, so that individual police officers can foster close working relationships with the citizens in
those communities. See P.A.J. Waddington, Editorial, Community Policing, 1 POLICING 129
(2007) (evaluating the gaps between community policing theory and practice and the attendant
criticisms).
160. James J. Willis et al., Recommendations for Integrating Compstat and Community Policing, 4
POLICING 182, 182–83 (2010).
161. See Mengyan Dai & Richard R. Johnson, Is Neighborhood Context a Confounder? Ex-
ploring the Effects of Citizen Race and Neighborhood Context on Satisfaction with the Police, 32 POLIC-
ING INT’L J. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT.  595 (2009) (exploring the effects of race and
neighborhood on attitudes toward police); Ioanna Gouseti, Construal Level Theory and Fear of
Crime, in PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR, CRIME AND THE MEDIA (Derek Chadee ed., 2015) (examin-
ing levels of fear of crime as they relate to a person’s perceived psychological proximity to
crime); Yung-Lien Lai & Jihong Solomon Zhao, The Impact of Race/Ethnicity, Neighborhood Con-
text, and Police/Citizen Interaction on Residents’ Attitudes Toward the Police, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 685
(2010) (a survey of public attitudes toward police and police behavior, by race, ethnicity, and
neighborhood); David Weisburd et al., The Possible “Backfire” Effects of Hot Spots Policing: An
Experimental Assessment of Impacts on Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy, 7 J. EXP. CRIMINOL-
OGY 297, 300-301 (2011) (examining unintended side-effects of hot spots policing, including an
inflated fear of crime); David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime,
Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 48-49 (2004) (studying
various police techniques and their effects on reducing crime and fear of crime).
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community goals rather than those of police departments or outside inter-
ests. Transparency is critical to this step’s success—police management
must create a system through which community members can not only
seek police assistance, but can examine the systems and goals the police
themselves use to guide their day-to-day patrol activities. Another critical
part of this transformation is an immediate increase in accountability
within police departments. Automation bias, data bias, and corrupted pro-
cedures and goals often give police departments a certain amount of artifi-
cial cover when things go badly. However, technological opacity is no
substitute for human accountability up and down the LEA management
chain. Finally, law enforcement resources must be shifted towards a citi-
zen-focused organization, giving rank-and-file police officers the power to
help drive automation policy, while also giving them the discretion to
problem solve independent of the automated process.
B. Incorporate Outcome and Process Feedback into Existing Systems
We live in a time in which our lives are increasingly influenced and
affected—whether we know it or not—by data, algorithms, and machine
learning.162 It would be a mistake to believe that police departments would
somehow be immune to this trend. Therefore, the solution to modern (or
post-modern) problems of public safety is not to go the way of Ned Ludd,
but to develop police decision support systems with an eye toward civil
rights, and avoiding race discrimination and economic injustice.
The key principle in developing any of these systems is transparency.
In Floyd et al. v. City of New York,163 the court held that the NYPD’s stop
and frisk program violated the Fourth Amendment by systematically con-
ducting warrantless searches of pedestrians, the majority of which were
African-American or Hispanic. Under the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk pro-
gram, police made over 4.4 million stops between 2004 and 2012.164 Over
half of these stops were of Black citizens, thirty percent were of Hispanic
citizens, and only ten percent were of White citizens.165  The guidelines
that backed such a system were based on opaque police policy decisions
implementing a broken windows policing model, and thereby creating the
sort of insular environment that often fails to punish bad actors and creates
perverse incentives.166 Further, since most police departments do not em-
162. See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR
THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015); FRANK PASQUALE,
THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFOR-
MATION (2015).
163. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
164. Id. at 556.
165. Id. at 559.
166. See David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and
Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 50-51 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, Re-
flecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows
FALL 2016] Tightening the OODA Loop 135
ploy software developers or statisticians, they are forced to purchase their
decision support systems from third party contractors.167 The same princi-
ples of transparency should apply to contractors so as to avoid these
problems.
Next, algorithmic and predictive policing systems need to be based
on accurate and meaningful data. For example, police stop and frisk pro-
grams, despite criticisms and claims of racial bias inherent in these pro-
grams, have been widely supported by LEAs based on their assertions that,
while more minorities are subject to these stops, it is only because minori-
ties commit disproportionately more crimes than Whites, and not due to
any particular bias of police officers and departments.168 To support these
claims, police often cite automated police intelligence systems, such as
Compstat, to justify these stops.169 Statistical studies conducted on stop
and frisk data, however, have shown that minorities are far more likely
subjects of these programs, with statistical patterns pointing toward a struc-
tural racial bias, reinforced through automated decision support tools.170
Finally, we must be cognizant of the limitations of purely technical
solutions to human problems. Mathematical and computer models of real-
life systems can, of course, provide critical insights into complex systems,
but they are imperfect. Algorithms for deriving patterns from large
amounts of seemingly random data are getting better as research and tech-
nology progress, but their most effective use within the broken windows
policing model is as a supplemental tool informing human decision mak-
ing, not as a digital crutch upon which bad practices and biased policing
may rest.
Further, known biases in automation systems can be mitigated
through a number of established means. For example, automation bias and
automation complacency can be avoided by increasing accountability by
the users of a system.171 By requiring system operators to provide com-
plete justifications for their decisions—beyond “the machine told me
Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1998). See
also Jeremy D. Finn & Timothy J. Servoss, Misbehavior, Suspensions, and Security Measures in
High School: Racial/Ethnic and Gender Differences, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 1, 2 (2015)
(exploring the relationships between student behavior, administrative discipline, race, and
gender).
167. See generally David Dannels & Heather Smith, Implementation Challenges of Intelligence
Led Policing in a Quasi-rural County, 24 J. CRIME & JUST. 103 (2001) (examining the technologi-
cal challenges facing small police departments, often requiring a reliance on third-party contrac-
tors for installation, training, and maintenance of intelligence systems).
168. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD’s “Stop-and-
Frisk Policy” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007).
169. See, e.g., Weisburd et al., The Possible “Backfire” Effects of Hot Spots Policing, supra note
161, at 299-300.
170. Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 168, at 813-14.
171. See Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen Mosier & Mark D. Burdick, Accountability and Automa-
tion bias, 52 INT’L J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 701 (2000).
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so”—users will be driven toward deeper cognitive engagement and aware-
ness of alternative information sources.172 The level of automation used in
a situation should also be carefully assessed on a domain basis. That is, the
level of automation available can exceed the level of automation necessary
for a given situation.173 Repetitive, rigid tasks that expect no user deci-
sion-making flexibility are often good candidates for a high degree of
automation, while those tasks that rely on human intuition, pattern per-
ception, and contextual reasoning, are best served with lower levels of
automation.174 Much of the work of law enforcement falls into this latter
category.
For the time being, algorithmic and predictive approaches are only as
useful as their human creators. Selecting the proper policing model for
every instance is likely impossible, so one of the most important decisions
in the field of machine learning is the selection of the model that will
provide superior results for a particular problem, a task which still requires
an experienced and informed human in the loop.175 But this limit can be
leveraged as a benefit, rather than a liability, by using predictive systems to
decentralize police command structures, and allow more creativity and ini-
tiative among rank-and-file patrol officers, characteristics that are critical to
a true community-policing model.176
CONCLUSION
The problem of bias in algorithmic policing has deep roots, as evi-
denced above. Solutions to this problem cannot ignore technological ad-
vances that help us make better, more efficient decisions, but they also
cannot allow these technologies to subvert the proper role of public safety
in our communities. We live in an information society that is, once again,
experiencing a crisis of control that we are naturally inclined to solve
through data and analytic methods. But our approach must be based on
lessons learned from our successes and failures in this arena. Many of these
failures have led to a trust deficit between authorities and the communities
172. Id. at 703-704. See also Mark D. Burdick et al., The Ameliorating Effects of Accountability
on Automation Bias, in THIRD ANN. SYMP. ON HUM. INTERACTION WITH COMPLEX SYS. HICS
‘96, at 174 (1996).
173. See Mary L. Cummings, Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support
Systems, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, AIAA 1ST INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS TECH-
NICAL CONF. 1 (2004).
174. Id. at 1-2.
175. See Christophe Giraud-Carrier, Beyond Predictive Accuracy: What?, in PROC. ECML-
98 WORKSHOP UPGRADING ON LEARNING TO META-LEVEL: MODEL SELECTION & DATA
TRANSFORMATION 78 (1998), http://dml.cs.byu.edu/~cgc/pubs/ECML98%20WS%20Summa
ry.html.
176. See James J. Willis et al., Recommendations for Integrating Compstat and Community Polic-
ing, 4 POLICING 182–93 (2010).
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they govern, especially where racial prejudices have been part of these fail-
ures. Addressing these disparities in algorithmic policing cannot solve all of
these problems, but it is a good start.
